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ABSTRACT MONTEREY Ca ? '^OOL
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the advantages and disadvantages of
centralized versus decentralized allotments in the Naval Surface Reserve Force. This
research will assist the Reserves in determining which system offers the most efficient use
ofdiminishing resources. A literature review on private and government sector systems was
completed. Interviews were conducted with key personnel at echelons two, three, and four.
The next step was to establish an historical background of the Naval Surface Reserve Force
and a baseline ofthe Reserve Personnel Navy (RPN) and Operations and Maintenance Navy
Reserve (O&MNR) allotments. The resultant analysis explains the advantages and
disadvantages of the two allotments. If the RPN allotment were decentralized, it would
allow responsibility at a lower level, more efficient utilization of funds, and a better
identification of actual costs. Decentralization of the RPN allotment to the echelon four
command level would entail additional costs for manpower, training, and Management
Information Systems. It is recommended that some portions of the RPN allotment be
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. BACKGROUND
On April 11, 1996, the Department of Defense Inspector General (DoD IG) issued a draft
audit report, and on June 28, 1996, a final report was delivered examining the use of the centrally
managed allotment (CMA) accounting system. The CMA system is presently used by all DoD
Reserve components for Reserve pay and appropriations instead of decentralized allotments. This
report recommended that t4the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) establish a working group
with the Assistant Secretary ofDefense (Reserve Affairs), the Reserve components, and the Defense
Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) to consider converting Reserve and National Guard
Personnel appropriations to decentralized allotments." (GDSS, 1996, pg. 3)
The Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) requested this audit as a result of a policy
change that he is considering to switch the DoD Reserve pay accounting system from
centralized to decentralized allotments. (DoD IG report, 1996, pg. i)
According to the audit report:
Most ofthe $8 billion spent annually for payment of about 927,000 Reservists is paid
through CMAs. DoD considers CMAs a risk because controls are maintained at one
level and obligations are incurred at another level. A CMA is comparable to an open
checking account, where checks may be written at any time without knowledge of the
available balance. (DoD IG report, 1996, pg. i)
DoD regulation 7000. 14-R states that:
CMAs shall be established only when the administration of decentralized allotments
is impractical. Any request to establish a CMA must justify the need, delineate
alternatives, and clearly show why a CMA is the only practical procedure. A CMA
must be approved by the DoD component head. Prior to Approval, the head of the
operating agency requesting the CMA must state that adequate controls are in place
to avoid overobligating or overexpending of the allotment. Each CMA must be
reviewed annually to determine whether it should be continued. (DoD 7000. 14R
Vol. 14, 1995, pg. A-4)
For the fiscal year (FY) 1994 budget, the cost of annual training (AT) for the Naval Reserves
was estimated at three million dollars for 1,650 orders. As the fiscal year came to an end, 7,300
orders were actually processed, at a cost of $14 million. These unanticipated expenditures were due
to increased fleet support for operations in Bosnia and Haiti. Support for these operations required
overseas travel, and this was more expensive than AT in the United States. These unanticipated
expenditures caused difficulty in the management of funds and increased the possibility that an
Antideficiency Act violation would occur. (DoD IG report, 1996, pg. 10)
"The Naval Reserve had difficulty reacting to the unanticipated expenditures because they
occurred late in the FY and with a delay of 60 to 90 days after liquidation before DFAS posting of
the data to the Naval Reserve's accounting system." (DoD IG, 1996, pg. 10) Even though a
subordinate command issued the orders, under the CMA system there was little incentive to manage
the funds since their financial responsibility was limited. Adding to the funding shortfall was the fact
that some anticipated officer attrition did not occur. This kept more personnel on the payroll than
had been budgeted. The end strength plan was not followed by subordinate commands. One official
from a subordinate command stated, that "he did not try to reduce end strength or staff days; he let
Headquarters, Naval Reserve Force (RESFOR), solve the problem." (DoD IG report, 1996, pg. 11)
B. OBJECTIVES
The objective of this thesis is to evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of centralized
versus decentralized allotment accounting systems in the Naval Surface Reserve Force
(SURFRESFOR). As resources are increasingly constrained, it is essential that SURFRESFOR get
as much "bang for the buck" as possible. This will only occur with the effective use of funding. The
analysis will address the feasibility ofdecentralizing allotments from a Headquarters level, an echelon
two command, to the lowest level, an echelon six command, in the Surface chain of command. An
analysis ofthe additional manpower and Management Information Systems (MIS) support that would
be required if echelons three through six were to exercise this new authority will be conducted.
Finally, this thesis will present some possible solutions to this dilemma from the results of research
and interviews. The information developed in this thesis will provide recommendations for
establishing or streamlining already existing systems.
C. THE RESEARCH QUESTION
The primary research question of this thesis is, "What are the advantages and
disadvantages ofCMAs and decentralized allotments in SURFRESFOR?"
Additional issues to be addressed include the following:
1. What MISs are needed to establish decentralized allotments at lower echelons?
2. Is additional manpower required for decentralization?
3
.
Do CMAs prevent flexibility in the use of funds at each echelon and reduce efficiency?
4. What is the estimated cost in establishing decentralized allotments?
5. Is it feasible to decentralize all or some allotments?
D. SCOPE
The scope of this thesis is an analysis of the impact of allowing CMAs from RESFOR to be
decentralized from echelon two through six in SURFRESFOR. The main focus is on the Reserve
Personnel Navy (RPN) allotment, with comparisons to the Operations and Maintenance Navy
Reserve (O&MNR) allotment, which is already decentralized. The specific levels examined for
decentralization are SURFRESFOR, Readiness Command (REDCOM), Reserve Center (RESCEN),
and a Reserve unit. Data gathered is from FY 1996 and 1997. One limitation was difficulty in
obtaining data to determine the effects on retention and readiness of not having decentralized
allotments at the lowest level.
E. METHODOLOGY
The first method used was interviews with key personnel. Interviews were conducted with
personnel assigned to RESFOR, SURFRESFOR, with REDCOM Comptroller organizations, and
with officials from Group Decision Support Systems (GDSS), contracted by DoD to conduct system
modeling on CMAs. These interviews focused on the disbursement of funds, advantages and
disadvantages ofCMAs and decentralized allotments, feasibility of implementation at lower echelons,
manpower requirements, and MISs required for decentralization.
My second method consisted of archival research. A literature review was conducted to
include prior Naval Postgraduate School theses, DoD IG audit reports, contracted research group
reports, DoD Financial Management Regulations, Budget Estimates of the Office of the Secretary
ofDefense/Office ofManagement and Budget (OMB), Internet articles on business oriented CMAs
and decentralized allotments, financial briefings, and various other publications.
F. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY
This thesis is divided into five chapters as follows:
Following this introductory chapter, Chapter II will place the CMA issue within
the context of budgeting, resource allocation, and expenditures. Chapter III will briefly discuss the
establishment ofthe Naval Reserves and provide a description of the SURFRESFOR's history and
organizational structure. Chapter IV will include an analysis and discussion of the feasibility of
establishing decentralized allotments from echelon three to echelon six. The final chapter will include




For this literature review, I reviewed books regarding centralization and decentralization
within the private sector and the government. This review was conducted to gather insight on the
similarities or differences between corporations and the public sector. Before we can discuss the level
of centralization and decentralization present in these entities, we must first define these two terms.
Centralization is the extent that decisions are made at relatively high levels
in the organization. Decentralization is the extent that discretion and authority to
make important decisions are delegated by top management to lower
levels of executive authority. (Simon, 1954, pg. 1)
A. PRIVATE SECTOR
1. Background
After the Second World War, students of business organizations questioned whether
companies should remain centralized or move toward decentralization. The discussion was based
on various companies' experiences, and such factors as decision making, resources, customer
satisfaction, and profit. Although the Navy does not make a profit, it has similarities to large
corporations, especially in the areas of decision making, resources, and customer satisfaction. A
single person cannot manage a large organization, without input from many people. Ifone person
is in charge and the organization grows, then that one person may become a hindrance to the success
of the company with centralized decision making. As top management becomes overloaded, they
must delegate certain company processes to subordinates. Of course, as more of the company's
functions are decentralized, there is more of an opportunity for delays in communication, action, and
decisions which are not compatible with corporate policy. As these problems grow, top management
assigns specialized staff personnel to solve these problems. (Morris, 1968, pg. 4)
2. Five Elements of Centralization and Decentralization
According to Simon, the degree of centralization or decentralization of a company
depends on five elements:
1
.
Structure of accounts and reports. A decentralized account structure is
one that provides a maximum of information about individual subordinate
organization units.
2. Geographical location. Geographical decentralization means locating
company personnel in locations other than the home office.
3. Formal authority relations. Decentralization of formal authority means
attaching accounting units directly to the operating units whose activities they are
recording.
4. Loyalties. Decentralization of loyalties means encouraging accounting
personnel to regard themselves as members of the operating team to which they are
providing service.
5. Channels of Communication. Decentralization of communication means
building up direct contact and communication between accounting personnel and the
executives and supervisors. (Simon, 1954, pg. 2)
3. Top Management
There are two elements that top management must establish prior to changing from a
centralized to a decentralized corporation. First, top management must be assured that their
divisional mangers make the same decisions as they would in the same situation. They have to place
substantial trust in these subordinate managers to ensure that these decisions regarding resources,
profit, customer satisfaction, or production are done in the best interests of the company. Unless
responsibility and authority are delegated, decentralization cannot take place. This causes a bit of a
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problem:
Authority may be divided in many ways. Responsibility can only be partially
delegated. An executive can delegate the responsibility for doing a job, but he still
retains the responsibility for seeing that job is done. It is this complication more than
any other, that makes delegation so difficult. (Baum, 1961, pg. 70)
Cordiner states, "lead by persuasion rather than command. This is inherent in the very idea
of decentralization." (Vancil, 1979, pg. 31) Another factor top management must consider is that
subordinate managers are evaluated on their effectiveness in attempting to accomplish the company's
goals. Top management must have a means to evaluate progress, but not use these evaluations as
a means to place fear into subordinates. If subordinates are fearful, they may become less proactive
because of possible career ending decisions. (Dearden, 1954, pg. 72)
4. The Matrix Concept
Corporations must decide which form they want their organization to follow: centralized,
decentralized, or a mixture of the two, called a matrix. Some companies have applied this matrix
concept ofcombining the best elements of centralization and decentralization. In the 1950's, General
Motors kept their divisions decentralized geographically and by products, yet the financial and legal
functions remained centralized at the headquarters. (Villers, 1954, pg. 89)
There are two functions that have to be handled correctly by any corporation, and
they are efficiency and adaptability.
'Efficiency,' the need to ensure that resources are not wasted. At the same time,
managers must be concerned with 'adaptability' of their organization in a competitive
marketplace, the need to ensure that existing products can be sold profitably, and
anticipate the needs of the customers. (Vancil, 1979, pg. 36)
The idea is not to choose one over the other, but to use both. Efficiency is driven by
repetitiveness, while adaptability relies on change. The matrix structure can accommodate both of
these different requirements. Management can focus on efficient use of inputs, while simultaneously
focusing on outputs, the key factors in adaptability. (Vancil, 1979, pgs 38&39)
B. GOVERNMENT
1. Background
Municipal decentralization started in the 1960's. In the early 1970's, President Nixon's New
Federalism attempted federal decentralization by giving more discretion to state and local
governments regarding federal resources. During this period, consideration was given to delegating
more administrative control to regional field offices. One of the first agencies to experience
decentralization was the Department of Labor. This agency was in charge of 10,000 project awards
annually. Under the new system, regional offices became responsible for these project awards. (Yin,
1977, pg. 1 13) As Yin states, "decentralization, in short, served as an impetus for reorganizing a
federal agency and thereby for changing bureaucratic rules and behaviors that may have become
overly rigid and unresponsive."(Yin, 1977, pg.122)
2. Efficiency and Innovation
In government, there is a need for administrative efficiency through decentralization. It is
very difficult to effectively run a government when the administration is inefficient due to the
centralization of top heavy overhead management. Decentralizing administration allows decisions
to be handled at a more workable level and gives personnel their initial government training.
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Administrative decentralization is a way to overcome a centralized federal bureaucracy.
This advantage, however, can also raise new problems. As these government agencies
established new regional offices, some of the questions that must be answered before successful
decentralization of governmental tasks can be accomplished are: How would power be delegated?
Who should approve policy? Is it necessary to man the regional offices for all contingencies?
(Benson, 1941, pgs. 13,14&21)
During the 1940's, some officials felt that decentralization of the federal government to the
state and local levels would actually produce inefficiency. As Benson states,
To achieve efficiency plus safety-which seems to be the common goal-readjustments
on all levels ofgovernment are essential. It is undoubtedly true that we cannot have
efficiency without permitting the federal government to assume those functions-
however untraditional-which it alone can perform properly. (Benson, 1941, pg. 167)
When it is likely that there are excess resources, slack develops in an organization.
This slack is defined by Thompson as:
Uncommitted and unspecified resources of appropriate personnel, finance, material,
and motivation; or if such resources have been committed and specified, it has been
done in such a way that they are recoverable. (Thompson, 1969, pg. 42)
With slack, it is possible for innovation to develop. In successful organizations there seems
to be more innovation When an organization has slack, it allows management to take on more risky
challenges and back innovation. "The presence of slack encourages the decentralization of control
over resources. Centralized control of resources creates a situation most hostile to innovation."
(Thompson, 1969, pg.43)
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When there is little slack, it reduces opportunities for innovation. Innovation can decrease
during periods of crisis management. Ifthe organization is constantly reactive, this will diminish the
ability of that organization to innovate. "In a centralized system, only those with authority can
legitimately innovate." (Thompson, 1969, pg. 99) This leads to top management feeling overwhelmed
in a centralized system. To reduce this feeling, management decentralizes some of their workload,
and this freedom gives way to innovation. Decentralization allows state and local agencies to
innovate without the fear of repercussions for making a choice. (Thompson, 1969, pgs. 98&99)
3. Power versus Technical Development
Bureaucratic centralization is a result oftwo causes; personal needs of persons in power and
technical development. By decentralizing governmental control, agencies must rely more on lower
level decision makers. This prevents top officials from micromanaging their agencies. Second, as
technical development increases, it leads to specialization. Due to new skills and new equipment, the
cost of this specialization tends to place control at a higher level. (Thompson, 1969, pg. 98)
4. Multilevel System
Stand-alone centralized or decentralized systems relating to resources and decision making
may not work all the time for governmental bureaucracies. There may be periods where one system
is more beneficial than the other, depending on the environment. A more workable solution allows
the multilevel-based government to use the best ofboth systems.
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Strong central government planning and budgeting are necessary for national goal-
setting and coordination Local governments are closer than the national government
to citizens in terms of democratic control. Local governments are likely to be more
responsive to variations at close hand, and they may be more efficient in service
delivery. This combination would allow national government to decide certain
programs and policies to be adopted, and local governments would have the authority
and obligation to spend revenue-sharing money on these specified programs. (Yates,
1982, pgs. 199 & 200)
C. SUMMARY
The concepts and elements associated with centralization and decentralization are integrated
into corporations and governmental agencies. Many are present in SURFRESFOR'S organizational
structure as it impacts the O&MNR allotment. Some ofthese concepts and elements may need to
be revisited during the process ofdecentralizing the centralized RPN allotment in the SURFRESFOR
chain of command. If we view SURFRESFOR as a division or a regional agency of the larger
RESFOR organization, many of these business and governmental practices can be applied towards
decentralizing.
Some of the decentralization structure needed for the RPN allotment is already in place.
SURFRESFOR has the benefit of their subordinate commands already being in different geographic
locations. These REDCOMs are working directly with RESCENs on local decision making,
operations, and resources regarding the O&MNR allotment. With decentralized RPN funds, lower
echelons could further control resources at their local level. The trust that the higher echelons must
have in these local decision makers is vital to the success of the implementation. Top management
must allow lower levels to make even more decisions without fear ofretribution. As long as decisions
are made in accordance with established goals and procedures, lower level echelons commanders can
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have the freedom to make decisions on their own about changes in operations, resources, and
manpower and personnel.
The lower level echelons must be evaluated on the degree to which they are meeting the
required missions or goals. If evaluations or comments appear to diminish initiative, the proactive
status of these lower personnel will decline. Decision making about funds will become so
conservative that money could be held back for fear of making the wrong choice.
Decentralizing the RPN allotment may allow for efficiency, innovation, and timeliness in the
use ofthese funds. This decentralization will require training to handle the new allotment policy and
possibly new MISs that are utilized for new RPN accounting procedures. It may not be feasible to
lower the RPN allotment authority completely to the lowest echelon. As with the private sector's
Matrix concept and the public sector's Multilevel system, it may require that only some of the RPN
accounts be delegated and only to certain levels.
As SURFRESFOR's resources become scarcer and requirements grow, the organization will
have to better utilize these resources. As with the private sector and other governmental agencies,
SURFRESFOR must find the best balance between the centralized and decentralized system concepts
to allow for better management of their future resources.
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III. SURFACE RESERVE FORCE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
Except where noted, the first three sections of this chapter draw upon a thesis written by
Richard C. Mazza, entitled Naval Reserve: An Organization In Transition.
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The Naval Reserves began as individual state navy militias which can be dated back
to the colonial period. "The Navy Department in 1887 prepared a plan of organization where the
Secretary ofthe Navy was given authority to lend each state having a militia one of the Navy's older
ships, as well as equipment, to 'promote drills and instruction. '"(Naval Reserve, 1995, pg. 2) These
militias came under the control of the Navy Department with the Navy Militia Act of 1914.
In 1915, with World War I (WWI) progressing in Europe, Congress established the Naval
Reserves. During WWI, Naval reservists served in various roles in support ofthe war effort. During
the years following WWI and until the Japanese Navy threat in 1938, the Naval Reserves suffered
from a post war force reduction and shortage of funds. During World War II and the Korean Conflict,
the Naval Reserves were once again mobilized. (Naval Reservist News, March 1995, pg. 7)
After the Second World War, the Naval Reserve reorganized its structure. The Naval Air
Reserve Training Command was established in 1946 at Glenview, Illinois. The Naval Reserve
Training Command (non-aviation) was established in 1956 at Omaha, Nebraska. The Naval Reserve
Training Command consisted of surface and submarine and other non-aviation units. The
Commandants of what were then called Naval Districts were responsible for the administration and
training of these Naval Reserve non-aviation units.
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These Naval Districts were in control of a specific Naval geographic region over which they
supervised non-aviation schedules. Even though the District Commandant was in control of non-
aviation units, the District Deputy Chief of Staff for Reserves had full authority for reserve activities
in that district. Prior to 1956, the District Commandants reported to the Director of the Naval
Reserve/Assistant ChiefofNaval Operations Naval Reserves (ACNO-NR). After the reorganization
in 1956, the Naval Districts reported directly to the Chief of Naval Reserve Training Command:
Within the Naval Districts, numerous Naval Reserve training centers provided drill
space, instruction, equipment, and administrative support to drilling reservists. These
training and administrative support functions were usually provided by a cadre of
Naval Officers known as Training and Administration for Reserves (TAR's).
(Mazza, 1992, pg. 25)
The RESCENs were commanded by a TAR officer who reported to the District Deputy Chief
of Stafffor Reserves. The reserve unit commanding officers (CO) reported directly to the RESCEN
CO.
Initially, a Reserve unit was utilized to augment an active duty ship during
mobilization:
Since it was not always feasible for an entire unit to augment a ship, it was decided
to reorganize units as 'surface reserve divisions.' Although the reserve divisions
drilled and trained together, each member of the division had an individual
mobilization billet corresponding to the needs of the fleet. (Mazza, 1992, pg. 26)
The Naval Districts ensured that fleet wide mobilization requirements were met with qualified
reservists in mobilization assignments. In times of mobilization, the reservists would be processed,
issued mobilization orders, and given government transportation to get to their required destinations.
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B. CONSOLIDATION
The Naval Reserve began to reorganize again with the establishment of the Total Force
Policy. In 1973, the Commander, Naval Reserve Force (CNAVRESFOR) established a new
headquarters in New Orleans, Louisiana, as well as a dual role as Director ofNaval Reserve. This
new headquarters consolidated Naval Air Reserve Training Command from Glenview, Illinois and
Naval Surface Reserve Training Command from Omaha, Nebraska at New Orleans, Louisiana. The
consolidation was important for policy implementation, resources, and the view of a Total Reserve
Force. Headquartered under CNAVRESFOR are the Commander, Naval Air Reserve Force
(CNAVAIRRESFOR) and the Commander, Naval Surface Reserve Force (CNAVSURFRESFOR).
C. NAVAL SURFACE RESERVE FORCE
In 1976, the Naval District Commandants shifted control of Surface Reserve Training Centers
to a command level called REDCOMs. Like the old Naval Districts, the REDCOMs would be in
charge ofNaval units in their specific geographic region.
Within this new restructuring, the REDCOM Commander reported directly to
COMNAVSURFRESFOR, and the RESCEN CO reported to these new regional
Commanders. The reserve unit CO still reported to the RESCEN CO.
In the early 70's, the Naval Reserve began a major effort to align Naval Reserve units
with active force commands. This period of horizontal integration of reserve units
with active components was an effort to institutionalize the 'One Navy' concept
originally envisioned under the Total Force Concept. COMNAVSURFRESFOR
ships were horizontally integrated into the active fleet for operational control. For
non-hardware or augment units, this was the beginning of the gaining command
concept presently in place. (Mazza, 1992, pg. 29)
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With input from fleet activities, this restructuring assisted in developing training and
mobilization standards that became a part of the gaining command concept. Due to the increase in
support to the active commands, some functions are now carried out exclusively by Reservists.
Commands reporting to COMNAVSURFRESFOR include:
REDCOMs, Naval Reserve Force Ships (NRFs), Mobile Inshore Undersea Warfare
units (MIUW), Naval Reserve Cargo Handling Battalions, Naval Reserve Fleet
Hospitals, Special Boat units, and many other combat and augment related to
the needs ofthe surface Navy. (Naval Reserve, 1995, pg. 2)
D. MISSION
During peacetime, the mission ofthe Naval Reserve is, 'io train Naval Reserve personnel to
perform the full range of assigned missions and tasks and to meet all mobilization readiness
requirements." (R-07A-0010, 1996, pg. 1-2-1) During mobilization, the Naval Reserves are, "to
augment the regular forces of the United States Navy in time of war or national emergency and at
other such times as national security requires."(R-07A-00 1 0, 1996, pg. 1-2-1)
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E. CHAIN OF COMMAND
The Naval Reserve chain of command consists of six different levels, called















Figure 1 : Naval Reserve Chain ofCommand
Echelon I is the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), responsible for the Naval Reserve's
organization, administration, equipment, and mobilization planning. The CNO prescribes programs
and units required through the Director, Naval Reserve (OP-N95) and coordinates overall plans,
policies, programming, and budget matters. (R-07A-0010, 1996, pg. 1-2-2)
Echelon II is COMNAVRESFOR. As the Director Naval Reserve (OP-95), he reports to the
CNO, with additional duty to Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet, (CINCLANTFLT), Commander
in Chief, Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT), and Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe
(CINCUSNAVEUR). COMNAVRESFOR commands the Naval Reserve Force, consisting of
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COMNAVAIRRESFOR, COMNAVSURFRESFOR, and Commander, Naval Reserve Recruiting
(COMNAVRESCRUITCOM). COMNAVRESFOR maintains training and administration of
Selected Reserves to keep the Naval Reserves in the highest state of readiness for
functions that the CNO may require. (R-07A-0010, 1996, pg. 1-2-2)
Echelon III consists of many commands, but the focus of this thesis is on
COMNAVSURFRESFOR, who manages resources, training, administration, operational control, and
coordination of the Naval Surface Reserve Force. (R-07A-0010, 1996, pg. 1-2-4)
Echelon rV consists ofmany commands, but once again the focus is on the REDCOMs. They
are responsible for managing personnel and resources for training, equipping, and maintaining
readiness for mobilization. The REDCOMs prepare and coordinate regional plans for mobilization
execution. (R-07A-0010, 1996, pg. 1-2-4)
Echelon V consists of the Naval Reserve Readiness Centers/Naval and Marine
Corps Reserve Readiness Centers/Naval Reserve Centers (NAVRESREDCENs/ NAVMARCOR-
RESREDCENs/NAVRESCENs). Although the Readiness Centers assist the RESCENs and conduct
on-site training, the Readiness/Reserve Centers still schedule, monitor training and resources, and
provide administrative support for reservists assigned to their command. (R-07A-0010, 1996, pg. 1-
2-5)
Echelon VI consists of the actual Naval Reserve units. These units are responsible for




COMNAVRESFOR has two key accounts. One is the O&MNR account. This account is
decentralized from this echelon two command to echelon four commands. At echelon four, the
REDCOMs transfer funds to the RESCEN level by assigning an Operating Target (OPTAR) which
allows the RESCEN to carry on operations with administrative but not legal responsibility.
The other major account is the RPN account. This account is centralized. Control of this
account remains at the echelon two level and is not delegated to any lower echelons. With both of
these allotments, COMNAVSURFRESFOR is primarily a monitor. This applies especially in the
O&MNR account where money goes from echelon two directly to echelon four, bypassing
COMNAVSURFRESFOR.
G. SUMMARY
Since the establishment ofthe Naval Reserves in 1915, Naval Reservists have participated in
several national conflicts. Over the years, the Naval Reserves have made numerous changes to keep
a force at a high state of readiness. These organizational changes were necessary to meet the
changing requirements of the Navy and global situations. Although the chain ofcommand allows
decentralization of most decisions, this downward authority does not pertain to the RPN account.
Under current budgetary concerns of diminishing resources and with a centralized RPN account, it




The analysis concentrated on factors affecting the centralized RPN allotment as a part of
SURFRESFOR. Although there is discussion of the decentralized O&MNR, it is only used for
comparison purposes. An established decentralized allotment was used to assist in understanding the
advantages and disadvantages ofdecentralizing the RPN allotment. This chapter begins by examining
the accounts which make up the RPN and O&MNR allotments. The next section covers the
advantages and disadvantages of centralized versus decentralized allotments based on the Group
Decision Support Systems report. The MIS section describes the current systems in place. Finally,
the last section covers the fees that DFAS charges for decentralized accounts.
A. RPN VERSUS O&MNR
As stated earlier, the RPN allotment is now centralized and is controlled at the RESFOR level.
The RPN allotment consists of Inactive Duty Training (IDT) pay and allowances, Inactive Duty
Training Travel (IDTT) travel and per diem, Annual Training (AT) and Active Duty Training (ADT)
pay and allowances, travel, and per diem, contract messing, rations in kind, incentive bonuses,
Veterans Administration educational assistance, and Selected Reserve (SELRES) uniforms, which
consist of allowances and issued clothing. Although the greatest portion of the RPN allotment is
centralized at the RESFOR level, a small portion of the allotment is decentralized. This decentralized
portion is the IDTT account which is at the REDCOM level. Although no RPN funds are delegated
to SURFRESFOR, they control how ADT mandays are utilized and monitor IDTT/AT at the
REDCOM levels. (R-07A-0010, 1996, pg. 4-2-4)
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The O&MNR allotment provides funds for the day to day operations and maintenance of
Naval Reserve Forces. Accounts within this allotment include fuel, supplies, contracts for
maintenance of equipment and facilities, civilian personnel salaries and benefits, contract berthing,
Temporary Additional Duty (TAD), and weapons and equipment repair parts. (R-07A-0010, 1996,
pg. 4-2-4) This allotment is decentralized, therefore the Operating Budget (OB) holder is the
REDCOM. This means that the REDCOMs are subject to legal requirements of Title 3 1 U. S. Code
1301 and Title 31 U.S. Code 1517, which are summarized below.
1. Title 31 U.S. Code 1301
Code 1301 is often referred to as the "color ofmoney law." It ensures that funds are used
only for specifically identified appropriations. As stated in DoD Financial Management Regulation
Vol. 14, "Appropriations shall be applied only to the objects for which the appropriations were made
except as otherwise provided by law." (DoD 7000.14R, 1995, pg. B-l 1)
2. Title 31 U.S. Code 1517
This code, "prohibits any Officer or Employee from making or authorizing an expenditure or
obligation exceeding an apportionment or the amount permitted by regulations." If a Code 1301
violation is discovered and accounting adjustments are recorded, the adjustments may reveal
overobligations or overexpenditures. These adjustments may lead to a Code 1517 violation. (DoD
7000. 14R, 1995, pg. B-24)
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B. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF CENTRALIZED AND
DECENTRALIZED ALLOTMENTS
On May 30, 1996, a meeting was convened with GDSS, representatives from the Office of
Secretary of Defense staff agencies, and several reserve components. During the discussions, a list
ofadvantages and disadvantages of centralized versus decentralized allotment systems was developed
and is included as Appendix B. The following discussion highlights those items from the list which
support findings by this author during the literature review and interviews.
1. Advantages of Centralized Allotments
In general, a centralized allotment is less costly than a decentralized allotment. With
centralized allotments, there are fewer workers and managers necessary to ensure that work is
accomplished. The training of personnel and the use ofMIS equipment are cheaper and easier to
manage at a higher echelon level than at lower levels. The overall cost ofmanpower, training, and
equipment for CMAs is lower and can lead to a more cost effective system. CMAs allow for
maximum flexibility of the allotment within the organization. It can give the claimant the ability to
move funding to various commands within the claimancy as deemed necessary. This flexibility leads
to higher obligation rates as funds can be maneuvered from command to command.
Top management will be less conservative in holding back contingency funds, and this will
lead to a higher execution and a more efficient use offunds. Control at a higher echelon, ensures that
one person is in charge and that minimizes the chance of a violation. Since one person is in charge,
ifthere is a violation, only one person is accountable. Finally, CMAs give the claimant the ability to
maintain very close control of these accounts.
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2. Disadvantages of Centralized Allotments
There is a lack of control over obligations with centralized allotments. Control of the
allotment at the claimancy level does not give top management a view of situations at the lower
levels. This provides top management with an incomplete picture relating to obligations and
expenditures, timeliness of information is slow, and this can lead to an increase in violations. The
higher echelons may not receive necessary information to make critical decisions on funds until too
late. Also, there is some delay in the accounting systems which can lead to an increase in unmatched
disbursements. Training on how the whole allotment works may be lacking at the lower echelons.
Obligations are estimated at a higher level, but executed at a lower level. The lower echelons
are closer to cost factors, therefore are more familiar with the execution of funds. The claimant has
a more difficult time monitoring execution and with changing rates on items such as air fares, they
may hardly ever have the complete picture. With few local controls, a CMA is like having an open
checkbook. Everyone spends, but no one can place their finger on how much is being spent at any
particular time. If the allotment is not tracked closely, it can lead to surprises and possible 1517
violations caused by overobligation or overexpediture from the lower echelons at the end of the FY.
With control of the allotment at higher levels, local commanders are not totally responsible, and
there is no real incentive toward efficient use of funds.
3. Advantages of Decentralized Allotments
Decentralized allotments allow the person in control of the obligations to be responsible.
Responsibility is at the lowest level. With this responsibility, 1517 authority can be delegated to these
lower echelons. As the responsibility and authority are delegated, unit commanders will take more
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interest in the efficient utilization of funds.
Actual costs are identified better at the local level, and this helps reduce the possibility of
overobligations. If current MISs were improved or appropriate new ones were created, transition
would be much easier for the field. Accounting information could be real time instead of delayed.
The new approach for large corporations and big business is the decentralization of decisions and
funds. Centralization is an antiquated concept, and as long as top management is in total control, it
will lead to a less effective organization.
4. Disadvantages of Decentralized Allotments
If allotments were delegated to lower echelons, training requirements associated with
handling the new funds would increase. Without effective personnel training, the number of
violations could actually increase. Besides the cost of training personnel, there will be additional
costs for new MIS programs and hardware at the lower echelons to handle the new allotment. The
workload at these lower echelons would increase considerably because of the requirements to handle
the new system. As the workload increases, additional manpower would be needed to sufficiently
manage these new requirements.
As the costs for training, MISs and manpower increases, the new system could actually cost
more than it was intended to save. Ifthe commanders become too conservative, they may hold on
to contingency funds longer than necessary, and this may reduce the obligation and expenditure rates.
As various higher echelons notice the lower obligation and expenditure rates, they may use these
indicators for budget marks to cut future funding. The whole appropriation becomes less flexible,
and the higher echelons cannot maneuver funds as easily. If there are surprises, the higher echelons
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will not be able to react as quickly, with less control over the allotment.
C. MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEMS
Throughout SURFRESFOR's organization, there are many MISs. These systems are used
for accounting or processing the O&MNR and RPN allotments. Some of the local systems are used
to update information for higher echelon systems. It is important to describe these systems to
understand how they are utilized to process the various funds. The following are brief descriptions
ofthese systems utilized for the various accounts.
1. Reserve Standard Training Administration and Readiness Support
The Reserve Standard Training Administration and Readiness Support (RSTARS) system
supports the manpower, personnel, and training functions at various Reserve echelons. RSTARS
consists of three subsets: Medical module, Manpower module, and Training module. A local
RESCEN updates their RSTARS database, focusing on personnel event reporting such as gains,
losses, miscellaneous changes, and pay. By using the Reserve Training Support System (RTSS), a
software interface, changes in the local database are transmitted to a centrally managed database for
the Reserves called the Inactive Manpower and Personnel Management Information System
(IMAPMIS).
IDT and billet management can also be done ifthe database is kept up to date. Data from the
manpower module is used by IMAPMIS and RESFOR for mobilization and budget purposes. This
updated data is transmitted via RTSS located at the Naval Reserve Information System Office
(NAVRISO) to the Naval Reserve Personnel Center to update IMAPMIS. RTSS will flag certain
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pay requirements and forward these to DFAS for Headquarters management action. This IDT
function ofthe manpower module is key for submission ofpay processing information. (R-07A-0010,
1996, pg. 1-8-1)
2. Fund Administration and Standardized Document Automation System
The Fund Administration and Standard Document Automation System (FASTDATA)
provides the fund administrator and cost centers a system to manage, track, and report allocated
funds. The system can generate standard source documents and accounting requirements for the fund
administrator and cost centers. RESCEN OPTAR obligations are made through FASTDATA, which
only obligates O&MNR funds. Since the RPN allotment is not decentralized, it does not utilize this
system. FASTDATA allows geographically separated RESCENs the capability to electronically
transmit obligations via the electronic bulletin board or a computer disk to their regional REDCOM.
(R-07A-0010, 1996, pg. 4-1-8)
3. Standard Accounting Reporting System-Field Level
The Standard Accounting Reporting System-Field Level (STARS-FL) uses a CNAVRESFOR
file transfer protocol program. This program is an interface between FASTDATA and STARS-FL.
It allows the REDCOM to take their respective RESCENs' consolidated obligations and upload them
to DFAS Pensacola. STARS-FL is used to verify transactions, for reconciliations, and to obtain
expenditure downloads. These expenditure downloads are then sent back through FASTDATA to
each respective RESCEN.
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4. Standard Training Event Planning and Scheduling
The Standard Training Event Planning and Scheduling (STEPS) system allows
SURFRESFOR echelons to develop training objectives six months prior to the new FY. From
STEPS, the planner can develop individual requirements, resources, and consolidated training. The
purpose of STEPS is to estimate the cost of AT, IDTT and ADT requirements, identify budget
requirements, and track cost information. As stated in the CO's Handbook, "STEPS is not an
accounting system, but a management tool to plan, schedule, and manage FY training events." (R-
07A-0010, 1996, pg. 2-6-2) One product of STEPS is a cost tracking report called the Annual
Planning Figure (APF), which is a letter for funding and mandays ofIDTT funds only. Although
there is no APF for any other RPN accounts, the RESCEN may estimate the number ofADT and AT
days requested by their Reserve units. (R-07A-0010, 1996, pg. 2-6-2)
5. Reserve Integrated Management System-Order Writing Module
The Reserve Integrated Management System-Order Writing Module (RIMS-OM) is a
software program that is tied to the RSTARS MP module. The program shares data regarding active
SELRES bodies at a RESCEN to assist in formulating IDTT, ADT and AT orders. The RESCEN
can request orders only for the Unit Identification Codes (UICs) under their command. The orders
are downloaded by Reserve Financial Management Active Duty for Training System (RSFMS), at
RESFOR, where they are approved, go to a Navy Passenger Transportation Office (NAVPTO), and
Scheduled Airline Traffic Office (SATO) for ticketing. RESFOR distributes the IDTT account to the
REDCOMs, which then distribute these funds to the RESCEN level. RIMS-OM identifies the
maximum IDTT funds available for the RESCEN, preventing RESCEN personnel from
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overobligating. Although the AT and ADT accounts are controlled by RESFOR, the RESCEN
can still place requests for orders.
D. THE DFAS FEE
In order to have the O&MNR allotment decentralized to the REDCOMs, the Reserves incur
a cost. DFAS charges RESFOR a billing fee for overhead to distribute this allotment to various lower
level OB holders. In RESFOR, there are 26 O&MNR OB holders. For purposes of this analysis,
this author is concentrating on SURFRESFOR's OB holders, which are the ten REDCOMs.
The following is a break down of the formula used in figuring the total cost charged to
RESFOR for having the O&MNR allotment lowered to the REDCOM level:
# of Subheads * # of Months * # of Years * Billing Rate = DFAS Fee
SubHead-There is one subhead per REDCOM OB holder; 10 total.
Months- 12 months for the year.
Years-Six active years = Calendar Year plus five previous years.
Billing Rate-The DFAS billing rate is $2475 dollars.
10*12*6*$2475 = $1,782,000
31
The 1,782,000 dollars is the fee that RESFOR must pay DFAS each year in order to have the
O&MNR allotment decentralized to the ten REDCOM OB holders. The fee goes up as the billing
rate increases each year or the number ofOB holders increases. For the fee to decrease, the number
ofOB holders or the billing rate must decrease.
E. SUMMARY
The O&MNR allotment is decentralized, while the RPN allotment remains centralized. With
decentralization of the O&MNR allotment, there are legal requirements that are delegated to the
REDCOMs. RESFOR controls the RPN allotment and only delegates a portion, the IDTT account,
by an OPTAR to the REDCOMs. There are many advantages and disadvantages of centralized
allotments and decentralized allotments. These include costs, flexibility of the allotment, additional
manpower and training requirements, accountability, and efficiency. The various MISs are used by
either the O&MNR allotment or a certain portion of the RPN allotment. These are used to establish
estimates, track funds, update larger database systems, or allow checks to be cut based on training
accomplished. Finally, the analysis reveals the overhead cost that DFAS charges RESFOR to have
the O&MNR allotment at a lower echelon. This cost would increase if the RPN allotment was also
decentralized.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CENTRALIZATION VERSUS DECENTRALIZATION
1. Conclusions
There are many strengths and weaknesses of both centralized and decentralized allotments.
The GDSS report, interviews, and the literature review regarding the private and public sectors have
shown that neither system is better than the other for all requirements. It appears that the best
solution is a combination of both systems. This would parallel the private sector's Matrix system,
or the public sector's Multilevel system. By using the best elements ofboth systems and by making
adjustments as the environment changes, the allotments could be managed more efficiently.
2. Recommendations
The system utilized must have elements from both centralization and decentralization applied
to the RPN allotment. The IDT portion of the RPN allotment should be kept at the RESFOR level,
where there are tight controls. If it were to be decentralized, there would be an enormous training
curve and workload that the lower echelons would not be able to address in a timely manner. IDTT
should remain at the REDCOM level, with 1517 authority. In addition to the IDTT account, the AT,
ADT, SELRES clothing, contract messing, and rations in kind accounts should be at a lower echelon.
It is recommended that this be attempted at two REDCOMs (one East coast, one West coast) for a
trial period of one year. These two REDCOMs can be later identified to handle the East and West
regional ADT requirements.
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Prior to the additional accounts being delegated to the REDCOM level, additional manpower,
MISs and training must be in place to support these functions. Once the various accounts are
delegated to the REDCOMs, they can "OPTAR" these funds to their respective RESCENs. It is the
view ofthis author that 1517 responsibility should not go any lower than the REDCOM level. With
little financial expertise, management would find it difficult to handle the allotment, and the cost to
lower funding to the echelon five and six levels would be significant. The knowledge and skills
necessary at those levels may not be sufficient to prevent 1517 violations from occurring.
B. MANPOWER AND TRAINING
1. Conclusions
In order to decentralize the RPN allotment to the REDCOM level, additional manpower and
training would be required. More manpower would be necessary for the additional workload that
will come with the new accounts. The added personnel and the current staff will also need training
on managing the new accounts and MISs.
2. Recommendations
Analysis determined that two additional personnel would be needed in lowering portions of
the RPN allotment. These would be two General Schedule-5 (GS-5) positions designated as
accounting technicians for each REDCOM. The two GS-5s would require an accounting refresher
course, and with the rest of the REDCOM Comptroller staff, training would consist of accounting
differences between the RPN allotment and O&MNR allotment. Training must concentrate on the
new accounting procedures and the new MISs.
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C. MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEMS
1. Conclusions
There are many MISs utilized in SURFRESFOR The O&MNR allotment uses FASTDATA
for accounting purposes. RIMS-OM and STARS-FL are replacing the outdated RSFMS. These new
systems will make decentralization of the RPN allotment feasible. With the RPN allotment
centralized, FASTDATA at the REDCOM and RESCEN levels may also be utilized for RPN
accounting, estimating, and numerous other transactions.
2. Recommendations
SURFRESFOR should continue to work with NAVRISO to further reduce the number of
and streamline existing MISs. The key to decentralizing any portion of the RPN allotment is to have
systems that are user friendly. It is best to have one system that can do all required tasks. One
system can also reduce the amount of funds needed to train personnel and maintain the various
systems. A system that can apply functions needed for O&MNR and the various RPN accounts
could allow personnel to easily reconcile data, retrieve timely reports, and conduct analysis.
With numerous MIS requirements and time constraints in developing software for various
functions, SURFRESFOR may consider working with NAVRISO in requesting assistance from the
Systems Management Department at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). This is a valuable
resource to move systems in the right direction and ahead of schedule. By utilizing NPS students,
funds normally set aside for consultation work, conducting research, and developing or submitting
updates to existing systems and software could be saved.
To decentralize some ofthe RPN accounts within the near future, a change is required to an
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existing system. It is this author's recommendation to utilize the FASTDATA system. This system
is already on line for the O&MNR allotment. With some updates in the software, FASTDATA could
assist in accommodating the new decentralized accounts. Although this may be a short term fix, it
will allow SURFRESFOR to move ahead on decentralization, rather than waiting a longer period of
time for development of a new system.
D. THE COST
1. Conclusions
The annual cost to decentralize O&MNR is estimated at 1 78,200 dollars per REDCOM. This
cost pays for the overhead that DFAS charges to RESFOR to lower this allotment to a different
command level. As this billing rate changes, the fee charged to RESFOR will also change.
2. Recommendations
Due to the cost of the billing rate, it is not economically feasible to decentralize the RPN
accounts beyond the REDCOM level. To decentralize these accounts to the echelon five and echelon
six levels would increase the fees. Eventually, these increased fees would outweigh the benefits and
they would exceed funding for training. The annual cost ofdecentralizing some RPN accounts to one
REDCOM is as follows (see Figure 2):
DFAS charges $178,200
Cost oftwo GS-5s $41,624
Total $219,824*
Figure 2: Cost of decentralizing to one REDCOM
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*Cost does not include the accounting refresher course with regards to lodging,
meals, travel, and any additional required hardware or software changes.
E. RETENTION AND READINESS
1. Conclusions
The research revealed no data on the effects of a centralized RPN allotment on retention or
readiness. It is the author's view that ifcertain short-fused training requirements developed and funds
were not transferred in a timely manner, those training opportunities could be lost. This may affect
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APPENDIX B. GROUP DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS FINDINGS
The following observations were made during the discussion on May 30, 1996.
1. ADVANTAGES OF CENTRALLY MANAGED ALLOTMENTS
a. Less costly than a closed (decentralized) system.
b. Easy to get global/overall appropriation picture than decentralizing.
c. The open allotment system has been used for several years. Difficult to
transition to closed system without substantial lead time to train, devise systems, and
account for manpower needs.
d. Maximum flexibility to adjust funds among different commands of the
Reserve Component Service.
e. Centralized management ensures the Reserve Component Chiefs programs are funded
and implemented.
f. Allows for higher obligation rates because there's only one "cushion," not a
"cushion" for each subordinate command.
g. Easier to train and manage one central office, rather than man satellite
organizations.
h. Decentralized accounting.
I. Control at a higher level of reporting.
j. Least likely for an anti-deficiency violation to occur because the data is rolled up at a
summary level for violation purposes.
k. Flexibility with the appropriation.
1. Ease of balancing the standard accounting system.
m. Simplicity of loading allotment.
n. There is less fallout on the lower echelons.
o. Reduced number of personnel to manage.
p. Anti Deficiency Act resides at appropriation level.
q. Flexibility to move funds.
r. There will be a smaller safety withhold leading to more execution of funds.
s. Fewer personnel are needed to manage.
t. Allows for control of funding responsibility at the appropriation level, rather than
reporting at several specific funding points. Greater potential for violations with a closed
system.
u. One comptroller making conservative estimates vice four or five down to the unit CO
level.
v. Efficient management of funds.
w. Potential for a large amount of fallout dollars due to reserves that must be
maintained by each funding point under a closed system.
x. Cost factors and analysis would be maintained at one level. Difficult to
decentralize accurately under a closed system.
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2. DISADVANTAGES OF CENTRALLY MANAGED ALLOTMENTS
a. Lack of control over obligations.
b. Lack of local funding control.
c. Hard to identify responsibility.
d. Timeliness of data.
e. With a lack of local level execution, it is easier to get an overobligation
violation.
f. Lack of Commander insight into actual costs of Pay and Allowances.
g. Service Component requires that DFAS accounting be responsible for
obligations and disbursements which they are in fact responsible for.
h. Lack of training at the unit level.
I. Obligations only as good as the cost factors available. Better understanding of what's
happening in program execution is available in the field.
j. Obligations are estimated at one level while incurred at another (unit unaware of
allotment balance).
k. Accounting systems are not real-time which increase unmatched
disbursements.
1. Too much guessing by higher echelons on execution.
m. Rates are constantly changing based on numerous variables (participation rates,
contingency operations, air fares).
n. Difficult to monitor execution.
o. Limits flexibility to maximize execution.
p. Disbursement lag time increases.
q. Lack of control at state level.
r. Open allotment is an open checkbook-no controls.
s. Unmatched disbursements increase.
t. Cannot establish accruals at detail level.
u. End of Year Surprises.
v. Dependence on estimated rates.
w. Delay in getting detailed execution data results in having to fix problems after the fact.
x. No visibility or concern at the unit level over actions creating obligations; no
incentive to be efficient.
3. ADVANTAGES OF DECENTRALIZED ALLOTMENTS
a. Obligations are controlled at a lower level.
b. Responsibility is in the hands of the person in control of the obligations.
c. Identifies actual cost by unit.
d. Responsibility and obligations are at the unit level.
e. Control of funds is at the local level.
f. "Pins the rose" on the person in the field who has the real control on how the money is
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spent.
g. Better responsibility over specific program, more people involved in
controlling costs.
h. Obligations will be controlled at a lower and more specific level.
I. Requirement for strong personnel and comptroller support at local level.
j. Requirement for strong comptroller and execution training for command
personnel.
k. 1517 delegated to the lower levels.
1. Anti Deficiency Act resides at program manager level.
m. Maximizes execution of funds.
n. State control of funds.
o. Real time accounting information.
p. Unit commanders are responsible for efficiency of funds.
q. Passes responsibility to the lowest level.
r. Decreases likelihood of overobligation.
s. Centralization is an outdated concept.
4. DISADVANTAGES OF DECENTRALIZED ALLOTMENTS
a. Training required for lower levels.
b. Increased hardware costs.
c. Lack of control over entire appropriation...less flexible.
d. Even with lower level accountability, Anti Deficiency Act violations may still occur.
e. The cost ofnew systems may be more than the overobligations that they are trying to
prevent.
f. The opportunities for fallout are higher at the lower echelons with
decentralized allotments.
g. Labor intensive.
h. No standard systems to support.
I. Will require more training and funds to put in place, create more workload at the field
level.
j. Will require a significant change to the military pay systems at DFAS.
k. The system lends itself to having more contingency funds (kitties) within the system to
preclude anti-deficiency act violations.
1. 1517 violations at field level would have the potential to increase, even though the total
appropriation is still solvent.
m. It would be harder to maintain good (97+%) execution rates for the
appropriation, because every subordinate command would retain funds to ensure that their
sub-allocation was not overspent.
n. Conservative estimates leading to under-execution of the program.
o. If under-execution occurs, Comptroller will not fund to previous level and cut funding
in subsequent years.
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p. Components are unable to react to unplanned events without control of funds at the HQ
level.
q. Manpower requirements could increase.
r. Management tools needed.
s. System dependent.
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